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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is one of the few western industrial nations that
does not limit the power of the employer to make arbitrary discharges.'
Until recently, employers could dismiss employees "for good cause, for
no cause or even a cause morally wrong, without thereby being guilty
of legal wrong."'2 This "employment-at-will" rule emerged in an atmos-
phere of rapid industrial growth. The absolute power to discharge an
employee was considered necessary to preserve the exercise of managerial
discretion in the work place and the freedom of the parties to make
their own contract.' The doctrine was first formally articulated in a
treatise on the law of master and servant:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring
is prima facte a hiring at-will, and if the servant seeks to make
it a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof
[I]t is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will
of either party 4
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1. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481, 508-19 (1976); St. Antoine, "You re fired!", 10 HUMAN RIGHTS L.
REV. 32, 33 (1982).
2. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1961) (quoting Payne
v. Western and Allegheny R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W 134 (1915)).
3. See Note, Protecting Employees At-Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1933 (1983); Note, Protecting At Will
Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1825 (1980).
4. H. G. WOOD, Law of Master and Servant § 134 at 273 (1877). This rule has
been severely criticized as not being supported by the authority upon which it relies. See
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 886-90 (Mich. 1980);
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341-45 (1974).
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This formulation became the generally accepted rule governing termi-
nation of employees.5
Recently, commentators have proposed that managerial discretion be
replaced by a rule of law requiring only "just cause" terminations.
These commentators argue that: (1) the freedom of contract underpin-
nings of the at-will rule are outdated; (2) individual employees in the
modern work force do not have the bargaining power to negotiate security
for the jobs on which they have grown to rely; and (3) much arbitrary
and capricious employer action is outside the proscriptions of the labor
and discrimination laws. 6 The courts of various states have responded
by limiting or modifying the at-will rule, but have been generally
unwilling to adopt a substantive rule of law requiring just cause dis-
missal.' The courts have nonetheless permitted recovery based on various
contract 8 and tort9 theories. At present, almost every discharge constitutes
a potential lawsuit.'0
The purpose of this Article is to provide a framework for preventing
"employment-at-will" lawsuits. The Article begins with an outline of
the various legal theories upon which such lawsuits are primarily prem-
ised, and then discusses some of the measures available to employers
to curtail litigation. Finally, a method is proposed by which an employer
might insulate management decisions from judicial review through the
implementation of voluntary internal grievance procedures and/or a
benefit plan governed by ERISA.
II. MODIFICATION OF THE AT-WILL RULE
The courts have utilized several theories to modify the at-will rule.
Many courts have applied contractual theories giving employees binding
5. See Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern
Employment At-Will Rule, 51 UMKC L. REV. 189 (1983).
6. See generally, Blades, Employment At-Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404-06 (1967);
Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1979).
7. See, e.g., Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (Ct. App.
1980); Run v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 474, 291 S.E.2d 779 (1982); Parnar
v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Washington 1984); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Company, 19 Ohio
St. 3d 100 (1986).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 14-33.
9. See in.ra text accompanying notes 59-90.
10. One commentator has stated that "many employment settings are rife with
potentially actionable 'promises'" Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge,
40 Bus. LAW. 1, 17 (1984).
246
[Vol. 2:2 1987]
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE SUITS
job security rights.! A second theory of recovery is predicated on the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which imposes liability
for many discharges not motivated by "just cause."' 2 Third, the tort of
wrongful discharge protects employees from employer action impeding
the operation of a public policy."
A. Contractual Theories
A significant number of courts recognize that the common law at-
will rule is merely a rebuttable presumption and not a ile of substantive
law limiting the freedom of the parties to provide for job security These
courts state that, unless otherwise agreed, an employment contract of
indefinite duration is presumed to be terminable at the will of either
party.' 4 Thus, these decisions center on the existence and necessity of
mutual assent and consideration in the particular case. 15
Contractual analysis is readily applicable when the hiring agent,
seeking to procure the prospective employee's services, makes represen-
tations concerning job security at a prehiring interview or at the time
of hiring. In such circumstances, the employee's commencing work
functions as both acceptance of and consideration for the employer's
promise of secure employment.16 However, employees do not typically
"bargain for" or inquire about job security at the hiring stage. Rather,
the employer usually promulgates a policy manual or handbook covering
such subjects as vacation, sick leave, holiday pay, severance pay, and
disciplinary procedures.'
7
11. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579,
292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn.
1983); Wooley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 99 N.J. 284, modified on other grounds, 101 N.J.
10 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820
(1986); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 39 Mont. 16, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982); Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., III Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal Rptr. 722 (1980); Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980);
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980); Frampton v.
Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1983);
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (Ariz. 1985).
15. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Wooly v. Hoffman-LaRoche, a
leading case in the field, interpreted "the common law of contracts in the light of
sound policy applicable to this modern setting" to find statements in an employment
manual binding on an employer even though the employee may not have relied upon
those statements. 99 N.J. 297, modified on other grounds, 101 N.J. 10 (1985).
16. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880,
890-91 (1980); Cowdry v. A. T. Transport, 367 N.W.2d 433 (Mich. App. 1985).
17. There are a plethora of cases dealing with the enforceability of representations
concerning vacation and sick leave, holiday and severance pay. See DeGuisseppe,
Effect of the Employment At-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe
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Some courts have found policy manuals or handbooks merely infor-
mational or instructional and not binding. These courts reason that
manuals cannot constitute a binding promise since such manuals are
unilaterally promulgated by the employer and are not the result of a
"bargained-for" exchange. Thus, definite mutual consent is lacking.'
Even under these strict requirements, employment manuals can give
rise to contractual rights when the particular manual is expressly bar-
gained for,' 9 or when the manual is expressly made part of an employment
agreement between the parties.20 Also, definite mutual assent may be
inferred where the employees are required to read, accept, or acknowl-
edge that they understand an employment manual which provides for
job security before they begin or continue employment.21
Many jurisdictions treat a unilaterally adopted employment manual
as an offer to a unilateral contract.22 An employee accepts the offer by
beginning or retaining employment with knowledge of the manual's
provisions. 23 The employee, although furnishing consideration for both
the provisions of the manual and compensation by continuing on the
job, is free to quit. 24 Courts have limited the employer's discretion to
discharge even though the manual in question did not expressly provide
for job security Modifications of the at-will relationship have been
Benefits, 10 FORD. URBAN L.J. 1, 3-4 (1981). The focus of this Article is on representations
of job security.
18. See, e.g., Rouse v. People's Natural Gas Co., 605 F Supp. 230 (D. Kan. 1985);
Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Satterfield v.
Lockheed Missle and Space Co., Inc., 617 F Supp. 1359 (D. S.C. 1985); Ferraro v.
Koelsch, 119 Wis. 2d 407, 350 N.W.2d 735 (Wis. App. 1984); Heideck v. Kent General
Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. Supr. 1982); Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78
Ill. App. 3d 117, 33 Ill. Dec. 937, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979). Other courts have expressed
concern that allowing policy statements to be imported into contractual relations between
the employer and employee would produce uncertainty in business relationships. See, e.g.,
Caster v. Hennessey, 727 F.2d 1075, 1077 (11 th Cir. 1984); Muller v. Stramberg Carlson
Corp., 427 So.2d 266, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
19. See Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d
193 (1982).
20. See Pupinsky v. Miller Brewing Co., 627 F Supp. 1181, 1188 (W.D. Pa. 1986);
Walker v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 335 S.E.2d 79, 83-84 (N.C. App. 1985).
21. See, e.g., Leikvold v. Valleyview Community Hospital, 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d
170 (Ariz. 1984); Watson v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hosp., Inc., 720 P.2d 632 (Idaho
1986); Thompson v. American Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F Supp. 409 (D.C. Va. 1985).
22. See, e.g., Findley v. Aetna Life and Casualty Co., 5 Conn. 394, 499 A.2d 64
(1985); Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 61 Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798 (1985); Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
23. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Metille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983);
Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., 61 Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798, 803 (1985); Wooley v.
Hoffman-LaRoche, 99 N.J. 284, 297, 491 A.2d 1257, 1264, modified on other grounds,
101 N.J. 10 (1985).
24. See, e.g., Wooley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 99 N.J. 284, 303-04, 491 A.2d 1257,
1267-68, modified on other grounds, 101 N.J. 10 (1985); Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983); Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., 61 Md. App.
381, 486 A.2d 798, 803 (1985).
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inferred from manuals which provide that oral or written notice will be
given before adverse employment action is taken, 25 a list of prohibited
conduct carrying the sanction of discharge, 26 or a probationary period
to new employees.27 Some courts scrutinize the manual to determine
whether the statements contained are sufficiently definite to bind the
employer contractually,28 while others find that the very existence of a
manual arguably implying job security creates a question of fact for
the jury as to whether an implied-in-fact contract exists.29
Even under a relaxed unilateral contract analysis, not every statement
of policy will give rise to a contractual obligation. "An employer's
general statements of policy are no more than that and do not meet
the contractual requirements for an offer."30 Thus, an invitation to
consider a job as a "career situation" was found not to constitute an
offer, even though such statement was communicated directly to the
individual employee involved rather than through an employment manual.3'
An employment contract can exist even in the absence of oral
representations or policy manuals. Some courts recognize that an em-
ployer's conduct and other pertinent circumstances may establish an
unwritten "common law" providing the equivalent of a just cause ter-
mination policy.32 In one case the court found that an employer's grant
of a disciplinary probationary period and references to plaintiffs good
work prior to probation "established a policy pertaining to [the employee]
by conduct and words to terminate only for just cause upon which she
25. See Enyeart v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 693 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. App. 1985); Staggs
v. Blue Cross of Md., 61 Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798 (1985); Thompson v. American
Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 409 (D.C. Va. 1985).
26. Watson v. Idaho Falls Cons. Hosps., Inc., 111 Idaho 44, 720 P.2d 632 (1986);
Cook v. Heck's, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W Va. 1986).
27. Wiskotom v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 1983).
28. See Cotter v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1986) (statement
that an immediate investigation would be undertaken when the company became aware
of any instance of apparent dishonesty was not specific enough to create an obligation to
fire only for just cause); Hopes v. Flack Hills Power and Light Co., 386 N.W.2d 490
(S.D. 1986) (performance appraisal procedure did not change the employer's right to
terminate employee at-will).
29. See, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 548, 688
P.2d 170, 174 (1984); Finley v. Aetna Life and Casualty Co., 5 Conn. App. 394, 499
A.2d 64, 73 (1985); Cook v. Heck's, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453, 459 (W Va. 1986).
30. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983). See also,
Ruch v. Strawbndge and Clothier, Inc., 567 F Supp. 1078, 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("[n]o
unilateral contract arises merely by the-fact that [the employer] has alerted its employees
that certain conduct may form the basis of a discharge.").
31. Degen v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 260 Minn. 424, 110 N.W.2d 863
(1961); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n., 407 N.W.2d 206 (N.D. 1987).
32. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 308 N.W.2d 459 (Mich. App. 1981);
Brewster v. Martin Marietta Aluminum Sales, Inc., 145 Mich. App. 641, 378 N.W.2d
558 (1985); Wiskotonis v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983).
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could rely "I' Thus, an employer's custom and practice of dealing with
employees fairly may give rise to a reasonable expectation of job security
which is enforceable in contract.
B. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
A second theory of recovery is predicated upon an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. The essence of this implied covenant is
that neither party will do anything to deprive the other party of the
benefits of the agreement.34 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
states that "good faith performance or enforcement emphasizes faith-
fulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party -35 Thus, it has been argued that
good faith in the termination of an at-will employment relationship
requires that all discharges be "for cause. '36
The implied covenant of good faith has not generally been adopted
as a substantive limitation on the employer's right to discharge. 37 The
courts reject such a blanket restriction on the ground that it would
infringe on the legitimate exercise of management discretion.3 1 If a duty
to terminate in good faith was implied into each employment contract,
each discharge would be subject "to judicial incursions into the amor-
phous concept of bad faith.139 Indeed, to imply such a right from the
existence of an at-will relationship, which, by its terms has no restrictions,
is internally inconsistent.40
An interpretation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
limiting an employer's discretion to discharge only for just cause "would
33. Brewster v. Martin Marietta Aluminum Sales, Inc., 145 Mich. App. 641, 378
N.W.2d 558 (1985).
34. Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768,
686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984); Fortune v. National Cash Register
Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (1977).
35. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 205, comment a (1979).
36. See Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1454-56 (1975).
37. See, e.g., Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (Ct. App.
1980); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232
(1982); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); Brockmeyer v.
Dunn and Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983). However, both Montana
and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted statutes requiring only "'good cause" termination.
The Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act as entacted by HB 241, L. 1987, eff.
July 1, 1987. V.I. CODE ANN. T. 24, Ch. 3, §§ 76-79 (1987); Wrongful Discharge, Supp.
II Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Indiv. Emp. Rights Man.) 588:1 (Dec. 29, 1986).
38. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dunn and Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d
834 (1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025
(1985).
39. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 377, 652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982).
40. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); Murphy v.
American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232
(1983).
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tread perilously close to abolishing completely the at-will doctrine and
establishing by judicial fiat the benefits which employees can and should
get only through collective bargaining agreements or tenure provisions. 41
Since blanket imposition of a "just cause" requirement fails to accord
consideration to the complexities of the particular employment involved,
adoption and definition of the covenant is best left to the legislature. 42
Despite the covenant's rejection as a substantive limitation on the
at-will rule, several theories of recovery fall under its rubric. In Koehrer
v. Superior Court,43 plaintiffs entered into a written contract with Oak
Capital to manage certain apartment buildings for one year. Oak Capital
terminated their employment four months later claiming they had done
a poor job managing the apartments. 44 The court held that an employer
may incur tort liability when the existence of good cause for discharge
is asserted "without a good faith belief that good cause for discharge
in fact exists -45 In such case, the employer has "attempted to
deprive the employee of the benefits of the agreement. '46
The Koehrer court relied upon Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc.
v. Standard Oil Co., wherein the California Supreme Court stated: "It
is sufficient to recognize that a party to a contract may incur tort
remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield
itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause,
that the contract exists.1 47 Thus, in order to sustain a claim on this
theory, a plaintiff must first show a breach of a valid existing contract.48
In Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp.,49 the California Court of Appeals
applied the covenant of good faith when the employee asserted rights
based on a company policy. Rulon-Miller had been dating an employee
of a competitor. Her supervisor characterized this as a conflict of interest
and brought it to her attention. Rulon-Miller insisted on her rights under
41. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 385, 710 P.2d 1025,
1040 (1985). "To hold otherwise would render the court a bargaining agent for every
employee not protected by statute or collective bargaining agreement, including employees
whom Congress has specifically excluded from the protection of the National Labor
Relations Act, such as those in management positions." Magnan v. Anaconda Industries,
193 Conn. 558, 571, 479 A.2d 781, 788 (1984). Indeed, a blanket "just cause" requirement
would wipe out job security as an incentive to unionize and possibly accord unionized
employees less protection than their unorganized counterparts.
42. See, e.g., Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 572, 479 A.2d 781, 788
(1985); Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
43. 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986).
44. Id. at 1161-62.
45. Id. at 1171.
46. Id.
47. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (1984).
48. See Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chem. Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr. 820, 832
(Ct. App. 1986); Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Ca. App. 3d 1155, 1171 (1986).
49. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
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a written IBM policy which gave her the right to privacy and a job at
IBM even though her "off the job" behavior might not meet the approval
of the employee's manager.5 0 The supervisor countered with a discharge
asserting a conflict of interest.5' The court found that sufficient evidence
existed to support the jury's finding that the employer, in fact, had no
belief that a conflict of interest existed. 2 Thus, Rulon-Miller may be
read to allow an action for "stonewalling" based upon intentional dis-
regard of a unilaterally implemented company policy which ripened into
a contractual right, rather than a bargained-for contract as in Koehrer 11
Although a number of factors are relied upon in finding a breach
of the covenant, courts struggle to define the meaning of "good faith
and fair dealing" in the context of employment.54 Some courts apply
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when the employer terminates
the plaintiffs employment without good cause and for the purpose of
retaining valuable benefits based on the employee's past service. 5 This
theory has been applied when the employer fired a salesperson without
good cause in order to deprive the employee of commissions on a
previous sale.56 In most of the decisions applying this theory, the dis-
charge not only lacked "cause", but was motivated by a desire to deprive
the employee of compensation attributable to past services.17 The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court recognized such a claim when an employee
was discharged without good cause in the absence of any improper
motive, yet was nonetheless deprived of ascertainable future financial
benefits related to past services.5"
50. Id. at 246 n.3, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 528 n.3.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 253.
53. In Rulon-Miller the court expressly found that the plaintiff's "right to be free
of inquiries concerning her personal life was based on substantive contract rights she had
flowing to her from IBM policies." 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 251, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 532
(1984).
54. See Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 478, 499
Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (1984); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 328-29,
171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (1981); Gray v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 820-21
(1986).
55. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 2 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (2 Indiv. Emp.
Rights Cas.) 56 (Feb. 24, 1987) (discharge motivated by desire to deprive employee of
pension); Maddalom v. Western Mass. Buslines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351
(1982), affg 422 N.E.2d 1379 (Mass. App. 1981); Khanna v. Micro Data Corp., 170
Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
56. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1971).
See also Khanna v. Micro Data Corp., 170 Cal. App. 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
57. See, e.g., Khanna v. Micro Data Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr.
860 (1985); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1971); Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Buslines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351
(1982), affg 12 Mass. App. 236, 422 N.E.2d 1379 (1981).
58. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21 (Mass. 1981); Cort v. Bristol
Meyers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 303-04, 431 N.E.2d 908, 910 (1982).
[Vol. 2:2 1987]
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE SUITS
C. Public Policy Exception
A majority of courts recognize the public policy exception to the
employment at-will rule. 9 Under this exception, a discharge which
frustrates a clear mandate of public policy gives rise to tort liability 60
Unlike the theories of recovery discussed above, application of the public
policy exception does not depend on express or implied representations
of job security, "but rather reflects a duty imposed by law upon all
employers in order to implement fundamental public policies
",61 Employees who have been accorded protection under this exception
are generally discharged for: (1) refusing to commit an act prohibited
by public policy; 62 (2) doing an act encouraged by public policy; 63 or
(3) asserting or exercising a well established right.64 Many courts none-
theless refuse to recognize the public policy exception. These courts
reason that such a radical change in existing law should be left to the
legislature which is in the best position to anticipate the impact of such
change and delineate its scope.
65
Courts have been most willing to apply the public policy exception
in situations in which the employee is discharged for refusing to commit
an unlawful or wrongful act. In Peterman v International Brotherhood
of Teamsters,66 the plaintiff refused his employer's request to commit
perjury before a legislative committee. The court found that to permit
discharge in such situations would seriously impair California's public
policy embodied in the state criminal code prohibition of perjury and
subordination of perjury.67
59. States that either adopted or expressed a willingness to adopt a public policy
exception to the at-will rule include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Note, Sides
v. Duke Hospital: A Public Policy Exception To The Employment-At-Will Rule, 64
N.C.L. REv. 840 n.5 (1986); Note, Employment-At-Will, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 457, 461-
62 n.25 (1985).
60. See, e.g., Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Ward v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,
179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
61. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1165, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820,
825 (1986).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 66-71.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 72-75.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 76-79.
65. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Traquilare Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977); Maus
v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App. 1982); Murphy v. American
Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
66. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
67. Id. at 189, 844 P.2d at 29. See also, Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652
P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982); Wiskotom v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1983).
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In Tameny v Atlantic Richfield," a sales representative was dis-
charged because he refused to put pressure on local service station
dealers to cut gasoline prices in furtherance of the company's scheme
to regulate prices. The Supreme Court of California held that the sales
representative had a cause of action in tort which would "implement
the fundamental policies embodied [in California's] penal statutes. '69
Similarly, in Harless v First National Bank of Fairmont," an office
manager reported violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act to his superiors. Shortly thereafter, the bank attempted
to discard the files containing information concerning the illegal practices.
The plaintiff was discharged after he prevented destruction of the files
and delivered them to the bank's auditors. The court found that these
facts stated a cause of action in furtherance of the state's public policy 71
The public policy exception has also been applied when the employee
is discharged for activity encouraged by public policy Thus, wrongful
discharge actions have been sustained when employees were discharged
for serving on juries.72 In Palmateer v International Harvester Com-
pany,73 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that, while no statute required
citizens to report criminal activity, public policy favors citizens who
discover and report crime. Thus, an employee discharged because he
reported illegal activity by a fellow employee to a law enforcement
agency was held to have stated a cause of action.7 4 Similarly, a discharge
motivated by a corporate president's threat to expose bribery and tax
fraud was found to contravene policies embodied in the federal tax
statutes.
75
The public policy exception has been applied in cases where the
employee is discharged for exercising a right recognized as well estab-
lished public policy Discharges that are reactions to an employee's
68. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
69. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844. See also Phipps v. Clark
Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) (wrongful discharge motivated by
a refusal to pump leaded gasoline into a vehicle designed for only unleaded gasoline, in
violation of Federal law).
70. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W Va. 1978).
71. Id. at 276.
72. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Ruether v. Fowler
& Williams, Inc. 255 Pa. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978). See also Johnson v. Appliance &
T.V Center, Inc., 2 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (2 Indiv. Emp. Rights Cas.) 481 (May 7,
1987) (wrongful discharge in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1875, providing statutory protection
to federal jurors).
73. 85 II1. 2d 125, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
74. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880. See also Brown v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 679
S.W.2d 836 (Ky. App. 1984) (report to state insurance department); Garibaldi v. Lucky
Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (report to state health officials).
75. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982). See also
Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., Ill Ill. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982).
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compensation claim 76 or union activity7" are held to be wrongful. Under
this rationale, the whole panoply of constitutional rights can be invoked
to protect an employee from discharge. For example, in Novosel v
Nationwide Insurance Company,78 the Third Circuit found an actionable
expression of public policy in the first amendment of the United States
Constitution and the analogous provision of the Pennsylvania State
Constitution. Novosel refused to lobby the state legislature in support
of Nationwide's position on no-fault insurance reform. The court held
that a corporation could not condition employment upon political sub-
ordination. The court side-stepped the requirement of state action and
stated that the political process would be irremediably distorted if a
corporation could control the political activities of the employees.7 9
An issue typically arising in "whistle-blower" cases is the requirement
that the activity complained of must in fact be unlawful or improper.80
Several states have enacted whistle-blower statutes to protect private
sector employees who disclose information concerning employer wrong-
doing.8' These statutes generally protect those entertaining a reasonable
belief that the reported activity is illegal and deny protection to those
knowingly making false statements.8 2 Some whistle-blowing statutes also
require the employee to first report the alleged illegal activity to the
employer and allow a reasonable time for rectification before reporting
the matter to a public body 83
In Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 4 the plaintiff al-
leged that she was fired because she refused to "moon" the audience
76. See, e.g., Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corp., 302 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. App. 1981);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central
Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev.
1984). Several states have specifically provided a cause of action by statute. See, e.g.,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (Page 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, 39A(a) (1979);
N.Y WORKERS' COmP LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
77. See Glen v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 769 (1961); Smith v. Baue Funeral Home, 370 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1963).
78. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 900. See also Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908
(1982) (right to privacy); Slohoda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 193 N.J. Super. 586, 475
A.2d 618 (1984) (same). But see Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985) (first
amendment applies only to state action and not to private employers).
80. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge - A Quadrennial Assessment
of the Labor Law Issue of the 80's, 40 Bus. LAW 1, 9-10 (1984).
81. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 20-12-1-8 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN.§§ 15.361-15.369 (West 1981) (Whistle Blowers Protection Act); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 833 (Supp. 1985); N.Y LABOR LAW § 740 (McKinneys Supp. 1987).
82. See, e.g., CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 10540-46, 19683 (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 31-51 (West 1986); Melchi v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 597 F Supp.
575 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (Michigan Whistle Blowers Protection Act); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 833 (1986).
83. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833 (1986); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 740
(McKinney Supp. 1987).
84. 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985).
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with her supervisor in a skit performed during a river rafting trip. The
court found the requisite public policy in Arizona's indecent exposure
statute even though such activity may not even have been a techmcal
violation of that statute. The court held that the statute established a
clear policy that public exposure of one's anus is contrary to public
standards of morality Thus, even though there is no crime, it may be
a violation of public policy to compel an employee "to do an act
ordinarily proscribed by the law." 5
Despite widespread acceptance of. this tort, the courts have not
formulated an adequate definition of "public policy" Most courts resort
to the vague formulation: "a clear mandate of public policy. '8 6 The
uncertainty engendered by the search for adequate sources of public
policy has been described as the "Achilles Heel" of the public policy
exception. 7 Indeed, application of the various constitutional provisions
to private employers makes the protection available under the public
policy exception quite expansive. 8
Some courts recognize judicial decisions as a source of public policy 89
However, it has been stated that "courts should proceed cautiously if
called upon to declare public policy absent some prior legislative or
judicial expression on the subject."90 This caution is well founded since
recognition of judicial decisions as the basis of public policy could
swallow the at-will rule and allow courts to impose something close to
a just cause standard on all discharges.
III. THE PREEMPTION OF EMPLOYMENT-RELATED
STATE REGULATION AND COMMON LAW ACTIONS BY
FEDERAL LABOR AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAWS
State authority to regulate the employment relationship and employ-
ment benefits is limited because many such regulations are preempted
by the federal statutes governing labor relations and pension rights.9
85. Id. at 380, 710 P.2d at 1035 (emphasis added).
86. See, e.g., Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Geary
v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
87. Palmateer v. Int'l Harvestor Co., 85 IIl. 2d 124, 130, 52 Ill. Dec. 13, 15-16, 421
N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981).
88. See supra text accompanying note 79.
89. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d
1025 (1985, Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IlI. 2d 124, 130, 52 Ill. Dec.
13, 15, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58,
72, 47 A.2d 505, 542 (1980). At least one decision has relied upon foreign law as a
source of public policy. Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F Supp. 1076 (N.D.
Cal. 1982) (Thai law).
90. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 65 Hawaii 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982).
91. Federal preemption of state laws is based on the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
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The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)92 and the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA or Taft-Hartley Act)93 are two federal statutes
operating to preempt attempts by states to legislate or otherwise regulate
various employment matters between employers and organized employ-
ees. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)94
establishes comprehensive federal regulations covering employee benefit
plans, and preempts state laws relating to employee pension and benefits
matters. This section briefly reviews the various doctrines and theories
of preemption developed and applied under the federal labor laws and
the interpretation and application of ERISA's preemption provisions.
Particularly, this section focuses on the manner in which federal reg-
ulatory schemes reduce the availability of state statutory and common
law wrongful discharge remedies.
A. Labor Law Preemption
The heading "Labor Law Preemption" is intrinsically misleading
because the displacement of state regulatory power in the area of labor
relations occurs under several different legal guises. Three distinct,
sometimes overlapping sources of preemption in the field of industrial
relations are: (1) Congress' intent to give the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB" or "the Board") exclusive jurisdiction over specified
areas; (2) Congress' intent to leave unregulated certain areas of labor
relations; and (3) Congress' intent that the interpretation of Section 301
labor collective bargaining agreements be resolved under uniform federal
law.
Each source or "theory" of preemption and its application to employee
wrongful discharge cases is briefly reviewed below. The third source of
preemption flowing from Section 301 of the LMRA95 is the most relevant
to the preclusion of wrongful discharge and other state-based actions
regulating the employment relationship, and accordingly receives more
extensive treatment.
made and pursuant thereof shall be the supreme law of the land " U.S. Const.
art. VI, Cl. 2, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1924). The supremacy
clause provides that federal law preempts conflicting state laws. The doctrine of preemption
is based on the critical inquiry whether Congress expressly or impliedly intends to preempt
state law in a given area. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978);
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 105 (1983).
92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
93. Id. at § 185 (A) (1982 & Supp. I 1983). The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§
151-188 (1985), governs employment disputes and industrial relations between carriers
and employees and also preempts independent employee wrongful discharge actions.
94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145, 1201-1242, 1301-1461 (1982).
95. Id. at § 185 (1982).
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1. The Three Theories of Preemption
a. NLRB Preemption
The National Labor Relations Board is the administrative agency
charged with the enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),96 and principally responsible for the regulation of labor rela-
tions. The Board is vested with jurisdiction over disputes arising under
the NLRA involving allegations of interference in the workplace, and
activities of employees, employers, and labor organizations protected by
federal labor law. Under Section 7 of the LMRA, 97 both organized and
nonorganized employees may engage in protected concerted activity,
such as for their mutual aid or protection, for which they may not be
disciplined or discharged. 9 Section 8 of the Act defines unfair labor
practices on the part of employers and unions.99
The NLRA vests the Board with exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
involving conduct that is either clearly protected by Section 7 or conduct
clearly prohibited by Section 8.100 With respect to these matters, NLRB
jurisdiction preempts the ability of a state court to enjoin or otherwise
regulate this conduct unless state police functions are affected.10' One
approach used to decide whether the NLRB has jurisdiction to determine
in the first instance if conduct is either protected or prohibited by the
labor laws is to analyze whether the controversy or dispute is identical
to the one that can be presented to the Board.10 2 Therefore, when the
interests of the Board and the federal labor laws and the state's interest
in providing a remedy to its citizens for particular conduct are "discrete
concerns," the state cause of action does not frustrate federal labor law
policy and is therefore not preempted.
Under a labor law preemption doctrine established in San Diego
Building Trades Council v Garmon,10 3 the Board's preemptive juris-
diction also extends to include disputes over conduct and activities
arguably protected by Section 7 or arguably prohibited by Section 8.
The so-called Garmon preemption is not based on actual federal pro-
96. Id. at §§ 151-168 (1982).
97. Id. at § 160(a).
98. NLRB v. Washington Aluminium Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
99. 20 U.S.C. § 161 (1982).
100. San Diego Bldg. Trades Counsel v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1958).
101. In addition to the supremacy clause, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides
a basis for federal labor law preemption. When a subject matter is considered beyond
the experience of the courts and within the province of a specialized administrative body,
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction establishes that the administrative agency will first
hear a dispute. The Board initially reviews most disputes in the field of labor relations.
102. In Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, the Supreme Court held that an employers promises
of permanent employment to workers hired as replacements for striking union members
could be enforced as a state court breach of contract action. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
103. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
258
[Vol. 2:2 1987]
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE SUITS
tection of the conduct at issue,' °4 but involves protecting the primary
jurisdiction of the NLRB.05
Under Garmon preemption, a court must balance the implicated state
and federal interests to determine if it must yield exclusive jurisdiction
to the Board. 0 6 Case law interpreting this balancing recognizes several
exceptions to Garmon preemption. These exceptions are: (1) when state
action is of peripheral concern to federal labor laws and the jurisdiction
of the Board; (2) when state action involves conduct in which the state
has an overriding interest, and which is deeply rooted in local concerns;
and (3) when minimal risk exists that state action will interfere with
the effective administration of federal labor policy. 10 7 The Garmon
preemption doctrine and its exceptions prevent application of certain
state laws to conduct that, although not directly prohibited or protected
by national law, could upset the balance of power between labor and
management established by the NLRA. 05
b. "Balance of Power" or 'MMachinists" Preemption
Preemption also occurs when states attempt to regulate an area in
which Congress has determined regulation should not exist. In Machinists
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,0 9 the Supreme Court
held that a state may not penalize a concerted refusal to work overtime.
Neither prohibited nor protected under the NLRA, the union's acts
nevertheless triggered an economic weapon unfettered by legislation and
thus intended by Congress "to be controlled by the free play of economic
forces.""10 In other words, no state can interfere with the right of
employers and unions to engage in the deployment of their economic
weapons when federal law contemplates the arsenal's use."' Under this
Machinists preemption rule, even state rules of general application that
alter the economic balance between labor and management are invalid,
unless it can be demonstrated that Congress has decided to permit the
state regulation at issue." 2
104. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders, 104 S. Ct. 3179, 3186
(1984).
105. Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912-13 n.9 (1985).
106. Id., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachussets Travelers Ins. Co., 105 S. Ct.
2380, 2394 n.26 (1985).
107. Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 104 S. Ct. 3179, 3186 (1984).
108. Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964); Cox, Recent Developments in
Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 278 (1980).
109. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
110. Id. at 140, quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachussets Travelers Ins. Co., 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2395 (1985).
111. Lodge 76 Int'l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
112. See New York Tel. Co, v. New York Labor Dep't, 440 U.S. 519, 539-40 (1979)
(plurality opinion); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachussets Travelers Ins.
Co., 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2394-95 nn.27-28.
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The Supreme Court, in a recent analysis of the scope of Machinists-
type preemption, emphasized that local or federal regulation establishing
minimum terms of employment is not necessarily preempted if the
purpose of the state legislation is not incompatible with the general
goals of the NLRA. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v Massa-
chussetts Travelers Insurance Co.," 3 the Court reviewed a Massachus-
setts law mandating certain mental health benefits for union and nonunion
employees alike. The Court concluded that the mandated benefit laws
constituted minimum standards independent of the collective bargaining
process minimally affecting interests implicated in the NLRA." 4 Ex-
pounding on this conclusion in Fort Halifax Packing Company, Inc. v
Coyne,' the Court declined to preempt a state statute requiring em-
ployers, under certain circumstances, to provide a severance payment
to employees. Acknowledging that "the Maine Statute gives employees
something for which they otherwise might have to bargain,"ii6 the Court
upheld the state's right to establish employee rights to certain levels of
severance pay
Construed broadly, the rule drawn from Metropolitan Life and Fort
Halifax could have major reverberations: that minimum state labor
standards designed to give specific minimum protections to both union
and nonunion workers are enforceable if they do not directly affect the
rights of self-organization or collective bargaining protected by the
NLRA.17
c. Section 301 Preemption
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1 9 4 7 1i8 gives federal and
state courts the power to enforce collective bargaining agreements." 9
The substantive law applied under Section 301 is a federal law of labor
which the courts fashion from the policies expressed in the national
113. 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2395-98 (1985).
114. Id. at 2397.
115. 107 S. Ct. 2211, 2222 (1987).
116. Id. at 2222. Maine is not the only jurisdiction with a statutory severance provision.
For example, Puerto Rico not only mandates severance pay but makes the statutory
severance payment an exclusive remedy for "discharge[] without good cause." P.R. LAWS,
ANN. tit. 29, § 185a-b (1986).
117. Although the Court recognized that under the Machinists preemption doctrine
"analysis of the structure of the federal labor law is to determine whether certain conduct
was meant to be unregulated," id. at 2394 n.27, it nevertheless appeared to concentrate
its analysis on the absence of conflict between the Massachussets law and protected or
prohibited conduct under the NLRA. See id. at 2398-99. This is curious, because to
conclude that the conduct regulated by a state is not even arguably protected or prohibited
by the NLRA is merely the first step in a Machinists preemption analysis. Id. at 2397-
99.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
119. Charles'Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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labor laws. 120 Thus, although state courts share concurrent jurisdiction
over Section 301 actions to enforce collective bargaining agreements, a
suit alleging a violation of a labor contract provision must be brought
under Section 301 and be resolved under the federal common law of
labor.'2'
For all practical matters, a Section 301 action alleging the violation
of a collective bargaining agreement will be resolved by deference to
an arbitrator's decision. In substance, the federal common law that has
developed under Section 301 provides that grievance and arbitration
machinery incorporated in virtually every labor agreement preempt all
but an extremely curtailed form of judicial scrutiny 122 Most collective
bargaining agreements contain a grievance and arbitration procedure to
resolve disputes over employment actions and contract interpretation.
This process has been described as creating an industrial jurisprudence
that referees (1) the respective employer and employee rights set forth
in an agreement, and (2) the disputes arising over the meaning of the
agreement's provisions.12 The agreement by employees to submit their
contractual disputes to grievance and arbitration processes is considered
the quid pro quo of a no strike clause granted to the employer.124 The
level of deference paid to this exchange parlays the statutory policy
favoring "the fullest use of collective bargaining in the arbitral process." 25
Under Section 301, an arbitrator's decision is considered final on the
merits as long as the award draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement. 26 Employees may not resort to an independent
civil lawsuit or contract claim in substitution for their rights under the
grievance procedure in a collective bargaining agreement. 27 Thus, the
law imposes on employees and employers alike the duty to exhaust their
rights under the internal grievance process and arbitration scheme.
The court will set aside an arbitration award only under a limited
set of circumstances. An award can be set aside if an arbitrator is
without the discretion or the express authority to settle a dispute. Judicial
120. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
121. Teamsters v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Allis Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1910-11 (1985).
122. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
123. Arbitration, in the vast majority of collective bargaining agreements, is the terminal
stage in the private grievance process. Less expensive and time consuming than litigation,
arbitration is seen as advancing the parties' cooperative efforts as a vehicle especially
attuned to labor-management relations. Typically, the arbitrator interprets and applies
provisions of the contract to a given dispute, applying knowledge about the custom and
practice of the industry or even that particular workplace. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1960).
124. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
125. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 841 (1971).
126. Id. at 731-32.
127. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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scrutiny is limited to the question of whether or not the parties agreed
to arbitrate the grievance. 2 The presumption is that an arbitration
clause is all-inclusive, and an arbitration result is overturned only if an
express provision excludes a particular grievance from arbitration. In
sum, a party choosing not to pursue grievance procedures is preempted
from bringing the Section 301 action, and an employment dispute
culminating in binding arbitration similarly cannot be reviewed on the
merits by a court.
In three cases, designated as the Steelworkers trilogy, the Supreme
Court enunciated and established the now well-accepted presumption of
arbitrability of labor disputes. 29 When confronted with a claim which
on its face is governed by the contract, the courts must compel arbi-
tration. Any doubts concerning arbitrability should be resolved in favor
of arbitration, unless the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an
interpretation covering the dispute.
For employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement con-
taining an arbitration clause, the presumption of arbitrability and the
deference to arbitration results seem to preclude the ability of employees
to successfully assert state law wrongful discharge claims. However,
federal and state courts have held that wrongful discharge actions based
on public policy and based in tort are also available for employees
covered by collective bargaining agreements. These categories of wrong-
ful discharge actions surviving Section 301 preemption are reviewed
below.130
2. Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge, Tort and Other
Employment-Related Actions
The exceptions to the preemption doctrine recognized in Garmon and
its progeny laid the foundation for the development of wrongful discharge
128. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
129. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 94 S. Ct. 629, 637 (1974).
130. Various federal law exceptions have been carved into the requirement of exhaustion
of contractual remedies. A union employee claiming discrimination under Title VII does
not forfeit or waive the private cause of action. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974). Similarly, employees can raise wage claims arising under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981). And, in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799
(1984), the Supreme Court held that an arbitration award did not prevent an employee
from bringing a Section 1983 civil rights action in a federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982).
These federal exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of contractual remedies and to
the finality of awards are well-defined and narrow, representing a deference to specific
and prominent national interests. In the recognition of these exceptions, national labor
policy favoring collective bargaining agreements and arbitration is balanced against a
competing national concern. Kenyon & Rohlik, "'Deflourng" Lucas Through Labored
Characterizations: Tort Actions of Untontzed Employees, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 44
(1985).
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exceptions. In Farmer v United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25,111
a union member's right to bring a state tort cause of action against the
union for the intentional infliction of emotional distress was upheld. In
permitting the tort action, the Supreme Court balanced the state's
interest in regulating the conduct against the potential for interference
in the federal regulatory scheme. 32 The Court established that to survive
the state tort must be either unrelated to the alleged discrimination by
the union against the union member, or "a function of the particularly
abusive manner in which the discrimination is accomplished or threat-
ened."' 33 The Court also emphasized that the California tort law per-
mitting recovery for emotional distress required a showing of outrageous
conduct.13 4
Thus, certain state causes of action sounding in tort are not preempted
if: (1) the elements of the tort are different than the elements of an
unfair labor practice charge; (2) different and alternative remedies are
available in state court for the employee; and (3) the tort action can
be resolved without an adjudication of the merits of the underlying
labor dispute. 35 In the wake of Farmer, courts have held that the
NLRA does not preempt union employees' claims of outrage or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress against their employers 36 Some
courts agree that the NLRA does not preempt a union employee's claim
of retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's compensation claim.13
7
In these cases, however, and in Farmer, the enforcement of an
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement was not at issue.
Even though courts have held that an action is not necessarily preempted
by federal labor law, it may be preempted by the employee's failure
to exhaust collective bargaining grievance procedures. 1"i Generally, if
the union employee's claim could be addressed by means of the collective
131. 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1970).
132. Id. at 297.
133. Id. at 305 (emphasis supplied).
134. Id.
135. Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J.
277, 283 (1980).
136. See, e.g., Collins v. General Time Corp., 549 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Ala. 1982);
Sitek v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 587 F Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Meuser v. Rocky
Mountain Hosp., 685 P.2d 776 (Colo. App. 1984).
137. The retaliatory discharge cause of action for filing workers' compensation claims
has been extended to union employees to provide a complete remedy to a victim of
retaliation, and to enforce and protect the state's unquestioned interest in the proper
operation 6f its workers' compensation scheme. See, e.g., Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc.,
105 I11. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984); Daughtery v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 603 F Supp.
975 (C.D. Ill. 1985); Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 207 Cal. Rptr. 663 (Cal. App. Dist.
2 1984); Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10tn Cir. 1981). But see Vantine v.
Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985); Taylor v. Saint Regis Paper Co.,
560 F. Supp. 546 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
138. See Pushing v. General Time Corp., 549 F Supp. 768 (N.D. Ala. 1982); Collins
v. General Time Corp., 549 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
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bargaining grievance procedure, it will be barred if the employee has
not exhausted that procedure. 13 9
The Supreme Court has settled that a tort label is insufficient to
avoid federal preemption under Section 301 of the LMRA if the issues
involved are substantially contractual. The interaction of state tort actions
and Section 301 preemption was explored in a recent Supreme Court
decision, Allis Chalmers Corp. v Lueck.140 In Allis Chalmers, the
employee brought an action in state court for the bad faith handling
of an insurance claim under a disability plan included in a collective
bargaining agreement.' 4 1 Because the employee did not grieve under the
collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that his claim was not breach of contract but a cause of action in tort
arising from the manner in which the disability claim was handled. 42
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tort claim was preempted
by Section 301. Reaffirming the preemptive effect of Section 301 to
"extend beyond suits alleging contract violations," 43 the Court outlined
the following test:
Our analysis must focus, then, on whether the [state] tort action
confers non-negotiable state law rights on employers or em-
ployees independent of any rights established by contract, or,
instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably inter-
twined with the consideration of the terms of the labor contract.
If the state tort law purports to define the meaning of the contract
relationship, that law is preempted. 44
The policies underlying this rule include the promotion of uniformity
in the interpretation of labor agreements, along with the need to preserve
the parties' federal right to agree that their contract disputes will be
resolved through arbitration. 45 The Court distinguished preemptable
rights that do not exist independently of private agreements (and thus
can be waived or altered by agreement) from substantive rights derived
from a separate body of law 146 The Court, however, did not consider
139. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Quincy Market Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 728 F.2d
568 (Ist Cir. 1984) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of
contract); Wynn v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 595 F Supp. 72 (D. Kan. 1984) (implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
140. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
141. Id. at 203-05.
142. Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 342 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Wis. 1984).
143. Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985).
144. Id. at 213. "[Tlhe question of whether the [State] tort is sufficiently independent
of federal contract interpretation to avoid preemption is, of course, a question of federal
law." Id. at 214.
145. Id. at 210-11, 219-20.
146. Id. at 213 n.8.
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"whether an independent, non-negotiable, state-imposed duty which does
not create similar problems of contract interpretation would be
preempted."1 47
In a decision handed down just this past term, the Supreme Court
sidestepped this open question once again. In International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 48 the Court reviewed an
Eleventh Circuit decision holding that a union employee's lawsuit against
the union for injuries she received at the workplace was a state common
law tort action turning on basic negligence pnnciples, and thus not
preempted by the federal labor laws. 49 The Supreme Court reversed,
observing that a court would have to review the collective bargaining
agreement to determine if the union had assumed the duty of care it
allegedly breached. As in Allis Chalmers it was necessary to interpret
the contract before imposing tort liability. 50 The Court, rejecting Hech-
ler's attempt to argue that the union was subject to a state-law duty
of care independent of the collective bargaining agreement, held that
Hechler's state-law theory was not properly presented to the courts
below.' 5' In dicta the Court continued that "[e]ven if such a state-law
obligation, which would directly regulate the responsibility of a union
in a workplace, could survive the pre-emptive power of federal labor
law, we conclude that it is too late in the day for respondent to present
to the Court this new-found legal theory." 5 2
Following Allis Chalmers, lower courts have plunged into the process
of deciding whether or not state law tort and contract claims brought
by union employees are "intertwined" with the terms of employment
covered by a collective bargaining contract. 53
147. Id. at 217 n.11.
148. 107 S. Ct. 2161 (1987).
149. Hechler v. International Brotherhood of Electncal Workers, AFL-CIO, 772 F.2d
788, 790-91, 794 (iith Cir. 1985).
150. IBEW v. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. 2161, 2166 (1987).
151. Id. at 2168 h.5.
152. Id. at 2169 n.5.
153. See, e.g., Snow v. Bechtel Const. Inc., 123 LRRM 3245 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (state
public policy claim preempted); Mann v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., No. 86-1008, slip op.
(W.D. Ark. Aug. 27, 1986) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim preempted);
Cox v. United Technologies, Inc., 1 IER Cases 1254 (1987) (retaliatory discharge public
policy claim preempted); Johnson v. Hussman Corp., 123 LRRM 3074 (8th Cir. 1986);
Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., No. 86-3985 (slip op. 4th Cir. Feb. 9, 1987) (invasion
of pnvacy claim for drug search preempted); Clarke v. Laborors, 123 LRRM 3173 (M.D.
Fla. 1986) (negligence action against union preempted). Courts ruling that union employees'
claims are not preempted include: Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp., 1 IER Cases
1242 (1987) (retaliatory discharge claim not preempted); Varnum v. Nu-Car Carriers,
123 LRRM 3068 (11th Cir. 1986) (state law fraud claim not preempted because it
involved conduct before acceptance of employment).
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B. ERISA Preemption
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) to correct a mounting tide of employee pension plan
abuse and mismanagement. 5 4 Congress perceived that state laws and
regulations were not adequate safeguards against the mismanagement
and fraud that jeopardized the distribution of private pension funds to
its employee participants. 55 To correct these abuses, ERISA attempts
to comprehensively regulate the establishment, operation and adminis-
tration of two types of employee benefit plans: welfare plans and pension
plans. "Employee welfare benefit plans" covers a wide variety of benefit
programs: from medical, accident, death, disability and unemployment
and vacation benefits to apprenticeship, and other non-pension fringe
benefits such as training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds,
and even prepaid legal services.'5 6 Welfare plans can also include any
benefit described in Section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 (the "Taft-Hartley Act").5 7 Pension plans provide retirement
or deferred income to employees.' ERISA regulates participation,
vesting, and funding of pension plans.5 9 Both the welfare and the pension
plans are subject to uniform reporting and disclosure requirements and
fiduciary standards. 60 The substantive terms of welfare plans, however,
are not regulated.' 6'
Congress recognized that a comprehensive and uniform body of federal
law was necessary to sufficiently protect employee benefit rights. The
154. H.R. Rep. No. 464, 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 4639 (Education and Labor Comm.) (1973).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l) provides as follows:
the terms "employee welfare benefits" and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund,
or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan,
fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for
its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise,
(A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, appren-
ticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or
prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title
(other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
Id.
157. Id. Under Taft-Hartley employers cannot make payments to union officials or
union funds. Employer contributions to union welfare funds are permitted if the fund is
administered jointly by the employer and the union. These funds are required to be in
trust and may only be distributed for certain purposes, viz: pensions, health benefits,
workers' compensation, unemployment benefits or accident and sickness benefits.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1982).
159. Id. at §§ 1051-1086 (1982).
160. Id. at §§ 1021-1031, 1101-1114.
161. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983). However, some regulation
of substantive welfare benefit provisions does occur through the Internal Revenue Code.
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resulting legislation was intended to insure that: (1) workers and be-
neficiaries receive sufficient information about their benefit plans; (2)
adequate standards of conduct control the administrators of employee
benefit plans and plan funds; and (3) adequate funds are maintained
to distribute promised benefits. Furthermore, under ERISA, no one,
including the employer, the union, or any other person, may fire or
otherwise discriminate against an employee in any way to prevent the
individual from obtaining a pension or welfare benefit or exercising his/
her rights under ERISA. 62
1. Employee's Remedies under ERISA
To implement its objectives, ERISA requires benefit plans to establish
"reasonable" procedures for the settlement of disputed claims. 63 The
claimant must be given at least 60 days after the claim has been denied
in which to request a review. If the denial is not reversed, the employee
must exhaust all administrative procedures before bringing suit in a
federal district court to enforce or clarify rights under a plan approved
by ERISA. 64 Congress vested jurisdiction in the United States District
Courts over such civil actions.165 However, a court should overturn an
administrator's decision only if the decision is arbitrary, capricious, made
in bad faith, not supported by substantial evidence, or erroneous on a
question of law. If the administrator's decision is a reasonable inter-
pretation of the plan's terms and made in good faith, it is not arbitrary
or capricious. This standard of review embraces the philosophy that a
court should defer to the administrator's reasonable resolutions of am-
biguities in the language of a plan. 66
ERISA requires exhaustion of the grievance process before resort to
litigation of a claim, and then allows only a deferential standard of
review of the decision. Therefore, to redress an administrator's adverse
162. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). Section 1140 of ERISA provides as follows:
[It is unlawful] for any person to discharge or discriminate against a participant
or beneficiary for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right
to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this subchapter, or
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act .Id.
See West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 244-46 (6th Cir. 1980); Zipf v. AT&T Co., 7 EBC
2289, 2291 (3d Cir. 1986).
163. Department of Labor regulations require employee benefit plans to describe these
claims procedures in the "summary plan description." The procedures have to include
giving participants and beneficiaries timely written notice of any time limits for filing
claims. The claim procedures cannot interfere with an employee's rights under ERISA.
If a claim for benefits is denied, ERISA requires an employee benefit plan (the "Plan")
to give adequate notice in writing to the employee explaining the reasons for the denial
and offer the employee a reasonable opportunity for a full and fair review of the decision.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1982).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982).
165. Id. at § 1132(e).
166. Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711-13 (9th Cir. 1985).
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determination with respect to any benefit provided in an employee
welfare benefit plan, the employee must exhaust administrative proce-
dures prior to appealing to the courts.'67 Employers incorporating all
potential ERISA-covered benefits in their welfare plan can take advan-
tage of this exhaustion requirement and, if litigated, ensure that the
court (not a jury) will scrutinize the decision under a favorable arbitrary
and capricious standard of review for administrative decisions.16
2. Preemption of State Laws
To prevent states from enacting laws conflicting with or undermining
ERISA's federal scheme for protecting private employee benefit rights,
Congress inserted an express state law preemption clause in ERISA
insuring its effectiveness.' 69 In Section 1144, Congress broadly mandates
that ERISA "supercede[s] any and all state laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" described under
the Act.'70
167. Parties bringing an action under ERISA Section 1132(a)(1)(B) to enforce or
clarify the terms of a benefit plan must exhaust administrative remedies. See, e.g., Wolf
v. National Shopmen, 728 F.2d 182, 185 (3rd Cir. 1984). There is a conflict between
the circuits, however, on whether Congress intended to condition an employee's ability to
redress all ERISA violations in federal court upon the exhaustion of internal remedies.
Some courts have held, for example, that claims based on Section 510 of ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1140, which provides that employees cannot be discharged or discriminated
against for the purpose of interfering with the employee's rights under the plan or under
ERISA, do not require exhaustion. Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.
1983), Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (l1th Cir. 1985), cert. dented,
106 S. Ct. 863 (1986). Other courts have concluded that Section 503 of ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1133, refers only to procedures regarding claims for benefits, and that Congress
intended that the remedy for Section 510 discrimination should be provided by the courts.
Zipf v. AT&T Co., 7 EBC 2289, 2290-92 (3d Cir. 1986); Amaro v. Continental Can Co.,
724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984).
168. Of course, this assumes that an employer first establishes an employee benefits
plan, for the existence of a plan is a prerequisite to jurisdiction under ERISA. A mere
allegation that an employer or employee organization ultimately decided to provide benefits
is not enough to invoke ERISA's coverage and does not allege the "establishment" of a
plan. Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1504 (9th Cir. 1985); see Donovan v.
Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982).
170. Section 1144(a) provides in full:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter
and subchapter III of chapter shall supercede any and all State Laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in Section
1003(a) of this Title and not exempt under Section 1003(b) of this Title. This
section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
The preemptive effect of Section 1144(a) is qualified by an "insurance savings
clause" which states that: Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in the
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of
any state which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.
Id. at I144(b)(2)A. A specified exception to the savings clause appears in section
1144(b)(2)(B), the "deemer clause," providing that an employee benefit plan shall not be
268
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The administration of plans requiring compliance with different laws
in different states resulted in high costs, lower wages, and fewer benefits.
Congress intended that uniformity and certainty as to controlling law
would encourage employees to establish pension and welfare plans, and
would make the administration of ERISA-covered employee benefit
plans less costly and more efficient.' 7' Section 1144 was enacted to
minimize the conflicts between state laws that varied widely in their
substantive and procedural requirements, and to "minimize interference
with the administration of employee benefit plans." 172 Hailing it as the
"crowning achievement of [the] legislation," Congress effectuated these
purposes with the expansive provision to preempt state laws that "relate
to" employee benefit plans covered by ERISA. 7 1 "State law" is defined
to include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other state action
having the effect of law, of any state."' 74
ERISA's preemption provision is explicit and broad. Supreme Court
cases addressing the issue of preemption of state statutes by Section
1141 begin with the question of whether the challenged state statute
"related to" employee benefit plans within the meaning of the preemption
provision. The Supreme Court's first review of ERISA's preemption
provision was in Allessi v Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.I7 1 Allessi held
that a New Jersey statute "related to" pension plans governed by ERISA
because federal law permits a method of calculating pension benefits
that the statute eliminated. 76 The Court concluded that "even indirect
state action bearing on private pensions may encroach upon the area
deemed to be an insurance company "for purposes of any law of any state purporting to
regulate insurance companies "The deemer clause reinforces the strength of ERISA's
preemption by scaling back the scope of the savings clause as a state's laws regulating
insurance companies and other insurance matters are not exempted when they are applied
directly to benefit plans. Recently, the Supreme Court has interpreted the savings and
deemer clauses and concluded that the savings clause "appears to have been designed to
preserve the McCarran-Ferguson Acts' [15 U.S.C. § 1012(a)] reservation of the business
of insurance to the States." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachussetts Travelers Ins.
Co., 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2392 n.21 (1985).
171. S. Rep. No. 383, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4999-5000 (Finance Committee)
(1973).
172. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105 n.25 (1983). Congress recognized
that state based claims and jury awards for "lost pension benefits" that far exceed an
employee/plaintiff's entitlement under a pension plan itself would not create "a favorable
setting for the growth and development of private pension plans." 1974 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 5166.
173. 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974) (Statement of Representative John Dent, Chairman
of the Subcommittee on Labor of the House and Labor Education Committee).
174. 29 U.S.C. § I144(c)(1).
175. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
176. Id. at 524.
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of exclusive federal concern." 177 In Shaw v Delta Airlines,178 the Court
again discussed the interpretation of Section 1141 and its scope and
pronounced that "relate to" should be given its broadest common sense
meaning to preempt all state laws having "a connection with or reference
to such a plan." The Court determined that the preemption section
displaces all state laws penetrating its sphere, even when they are
consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements. 17 9
In its most recent ERISA preemption decisions, the Court has rein-
forced the broad reading it gave to Section 1144 in Shaw 18o In Pilot
Life Insurance Co. v Dedeaux,iii the Court ruled that an employee's
common-law breach of contract and tort claims based on the improper
processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan fell
under ERISA's preemption clause. The Court determined that the
common law causes of action related to an employee benefits plan, and
further held that Section 502(a), 182 the civil enforcement provisions of
ERISA, are intended to be exclusive with the preemptive force of
Section 301.183 Therefore, state laws and regulations or state common
law claims are preempted insofar as they indirectly or directly present
177. Id. at 525.
178. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). The Court reviewed a New York law that requires employers
to provide identical benefits for pregnancy that are provided for other disabilities. Id. at
89-90.
179. Id. at 98-99. In Shaw, the Supreme Court relied on Black's Law Dictionary
1158 (Fifth Edition 1979) for its common sense definition of "relate"- "To stand in some
relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or
connection with." 463 U.S. 85, 97 n.16 (1983). In the earliest versions of ERISA the
general preemption clause displaced only those state laws that "relate to" benefit plans.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2392
n.23 (1985); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, 383 (1974). 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974)
(remarks of Rep. Dent).
180. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 105 S. Ct. 2380
(1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S. Ct. 1542 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987). In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court concluded
that although a Massachusetts statute mandating minimum mental health care benefits
related to ERISA benefit plans, it determined that the legislation was exempted under
the insurance savings clause, Section 1144(b)(2)(A).
181. 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
183. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1553, 1555-58 (1987). The
Court reviewed the deliberate parallel drawn by Congress between § 502(a) of ERISA
and § 301 of the LMRA, and concluded that like § 301 preemption all suits brought by
beneficiaries or participants asserting improper processing of claims under ERISA-regulated
plans should be treated as federal questions governed by § 502(a). Id. at 1557. In
Metropolitan Life v. Taylor, 107 S. Ct. 1542 (1987), the Court extended its holding in
Pilot Life by holding that common law causes of action preempted by ERISA that come
within the scope of § 502(a) are removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
This conclusion, that the "well-pleaded complaint" doctrine applies to recharacterize a
state law complaint as an action arising under ERISA, also flowed from the obvious
purpose of Congress to make § 502(a) suits federal questions in the same manner as
§ 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 1547
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"a connection with or reference to" a particular employee benefit plan.
In the three Supreme Court decisions holding that Section 1144
preempted specific state laws, no standard has been enuncihted defining
the outer limits of the phrase "relate to." A suggestion describing
parameters to the preemption provision appears in Shaw when the Court
pronounced that "some state actions may affect employee benefit plans
in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that
the law relates to the plan." s4 Thus, to review a state law or claim a
court must determine that the law's connection with or reference to the
employee benefit plan is more "remote" than "indirect," but "tenuous"
or "peripheral" to uphold the regulation as not preempted by ERISA.85
Some lower courts, however, have construed ERISA preemption more
narrowly and require that a state regulation must have a closer relation
to ERISA-covered benefit plans than a mere "connection with" or
"reference to" such plans.8 6 These courts limit the preemptive scope
of ERISA in Section 1144 to those state laws and regulations that
purport to directly or indirectly regulate the terms and conditions of
employee benefit plans. 87 Under each of these standards of preemption,
Section 1141 is applied to preempt a broad range of state laws. Of
particular relevance to this discussion are the preemption decisions
involving: (1) state laws and regulations impacting the terms or types
of benefits in ERISA plans; and (2) state laws and common law rules
providing remedies for abuses arising in the administration of an ERISA
plan, including breach of contract, fraud, and discrimination claims
based on determination of benefits.188
Both Shaw and Metropolitan Life are examples of state laws held
preempted because they regulated substantive areas covered by ERISA,
respectively, a requirement that employee benefit plans pay pregnancy
benefits and an indirect requirement that plans provide mental health
benefits.8 9 Similar statutory requirements that employers provide specific
184. 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
185. See AT&T Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
186. See Martori Bros. Distribs. v. James-Massengale, 781 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1986);
Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985); Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337
(9th Cir. 1984); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133 (2nd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2702 (1985); Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 690 F.2d 323 (2nd Cir. 1982),
affd sub. non., Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 453 U.S. 1220 (1983).
187. UFCW Arizona Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 7 EBC 2295, 2297 (9th Cir. 1986).
188. Other categories of laws that have been found preempted by Section 1144 are:
(1) state laws that create or impede reporting, disclosure, funding or vesting requirements
for ERISA plans; (2) state laws that attempt to govern the calculation of benefits to be
paid under ERISA plans; and (3) state laws which indirectly or directly tax employee
benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(5)(B)(i) (1982).
189. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., U.S. 85, 88-90 (1983); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2389 (1985).
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health and health-related benefits have been determined preempted. 90
These cases are not surprising, as Section 1002(1) explicitly lists a
variety of health benefits that are included in the definition of "employee
welfare benefit plan."
The most recent and interesting developments in the area of ERISA
preemption involve benefits that are not so obviously listed in the
definition of a welfare plan. Federal courts interpret severance pay as
an ERISA-covered benefit. 191 In Gilbert v Burlington Industries, Inc.,'92
the Second Circuit concluded that severance pay is an "unemployment"
benefit under Section 1002(1), and that the defendant's unfunded sev-
erance pay policy constituted an "employee welfare benefit plan."' 93
The court's opinion recognized that severance benefits are not expressly
enumerated in Section 1002(1)(A) and that the only mention of severance
pay is the reference to pooled severance benefits in Section 186(c). 194
However, the court rested its conclusion on its interpretation that sev-
erance pay is necessarily a benefit in the event of unemployment and
on "the reasonableness" of a Department of Labor regulation that
construes Section 1002(l)(B) to include severance pay 195 The court also
relied on similar decisions arriving at the conclusion that unfunded
severance pay plans are covered under ERISA. 9 6 The Gilbert court
further determined that the employee/plaintiff's statutory and common
law claims for severance pay and wage supplements were preempted
by ERISA. 197 The court ruled that "the state law claims seeking to
enforce the severance pay policy would determine whether any benefits
are paid, and directly affect the administration of benefits under the
plan." 9 The court observed that the plaintiffs in the action were
190. See, e.g., Children's Hosp. v. Whitcomb, 778 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1985) (mental
health benefits); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), affg, 442
F Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981) (alcohol and drug abuse
treatment benefits).
191. Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1985), summarily
affd., 106 S. Ct. 3267 (1986); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1985), affd mem. sub. nom., Roberts v. Burlington Indus., 106 S. Ct. 3267 (1986); Scott
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Adam v. Joy Mfg. Co., 651
F Supp. 1301 (D. N.H. 1987).
192. 765 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1985).
193. Id. at 325.
194. Section 1002(l)(B) includes within the definition of a welfare plan "any benefit"
described in 29 U.S.C. § 186(c).
195. 765 F.2d 320, 325 (2d Cir. 1985); see 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(a)(3) (1984); Blau
v. Delmonte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1985).
196. See, e.g., Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th Cir. 1985); Dhayer
v. Weirton Steel Division of Nat'l Steel Corp., 571 F Supp. 316, 329-30 (N.D. W Va.),
affd, 724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2387 (1984); Vatrella v.
N.L. Industries, Inc., 529 F Supp. 1357 (D. N.J. 1982); Pinto v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
480 F Supp. 361, 363 (N.D. II1. 1979), affd mem., 618 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1980);
Donnelly v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 468 F Supp. 696, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
197. 765 F.2d 320, 327 (2d Cir. 1985).
198. Id.
272
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employed in 16 different states and thus exemplified how the policy
favoring national uniformity in the field of employee benefits strongly
supported preemption. 99 Other courts disagree with the reasoning in
Gilbert, concluding instead that Congress did not intend to preempt
state laws concerning the availability of severance pay.200
The Supreme Court indirectly addresses this debate in a recent
decision upholding a Maine severance pay statute. In Fort Halifax
Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne,20 1 the Court ruled that the operation of a
statute requiring an employer, in the event of a plant closing, to provide
a one-time severance payment to employees was not preempted by
ERISA when the employer had not established a welfare benefits plan
with a severance provision. 202 Although the Maine law related to a
"benefit", the Court reasoned that in the case before it the statute did
not relate to a benefit "plan. '20 3 Responding to the accusation of the
four dissenting justices that the majority was overruling Gilbert and
other lower court decisions classifying plans paying severance benefits
as ERISA plans, 20 4 the majority found those cases "completely con-
sistent" with their analysis because the employers in the Burlington
cases paid severance benefits under a bona fide "plan.
20 5
Another controversial category of benefits is vacation benefits. Thus
far, some courts have ruled traditional vacation pay arrangements paid
out of an employer's general assets not preempted by ERISA and thus
subject to state regulation.20 6 However, vacation benefits not funded out
of any employer's general assets can be another welfare benefits plan
provision covered by ERISA.20 7 Practically, employers may have to
199. Id., but see National Metal Crafters v. McNeil, 602 F Supp. 232 (N.D. Ill.
1985).
200. Blakeman v. Mead, 7 EBC 1036 (6th Cir. 1985).
201. 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987).
202. Id. at 2215.
203. Id. at 2214-15.
204. Id. at 2224 (dissenting opinion).
205. Id. at 2220-21 (majority opinion).
206. See, e.g., California Hosp. Ass'n v. Hennings, 770 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1985);
National Metal Crafters v. McNeil, 602 F Supp. 232 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 784 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986); Shea v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 8
EBC 1369 (2nd Cir. 1987) (sick leave and vacation wages are excluded payroll practices
under ERISA). Although vacation benefits are expressly listed as ERISA employee welfare
benefit plans in the ERISA statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1982), some courts have
followed a Department of Labor regulation that exempts "payroll practice" payments of
employee compensation out of the general assets of an employer from employee welfare
benefit plans under ERISA. 20 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1 (1985). But see Holland v. National
Steel Corp., 791 F.2d 1132, 1134-36 (4th Cir. 1986) (West Virginia Statute requiring
employers to pay vacation pay even though employer eliminated its vacation benefits
program). Blakemen v. Mead Containers, 779 F.2d 1146, 1149 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985) (vacation
provisions fall under ERISA).
207. California Hosp. Ass'n v. Hennmings, 770 F.2d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 1985); Franchise
Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307, 1308-09 (9th
Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
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comply with state laws regulating vacation pay, but ERISA, not state
law, will govern how severance pay can be modified, denied, or eliminated
by an employer.20 1
Numerous examples are documented in the case law of state law-
based claims and common law causes of action based on the termination
of benefits. These cases apply the "connection with" or "reference to"
test enunciated in Shaw, and generally conclude that the state claims
"relate to" employee benefit plans.20 9 Among the causes of action
preempted are: (1) employee/plaintiff's claims that denial of benefits
is a breach of express or implied contract,2 0 or a breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) employee/plaintiff's claim
that denial of benefits constitutes various state tort claims; 2"1 or (3)
employee/plaintiffs claims that discharge was discriminatory because
based on employee's exercise of ERISA rights.21 2 In an interesting case,
the Sixth Circuit reviewed a Michigan wrongful discharge claim brought
by a fiduciary who asserted that he was terminated for fulfilling his
obligations under ERISA and that his discharge was in contravention
of public policy 213 The court determined that the wrongful discharge
action related to the ERISA pension plan involved, and that the public
policy invoked in the common law action was created by ERISA and
therefore preempted. The court further concluded that because the
action concerned the remedies available to a trustee of an ERISA
pension plan who was terminated for performing his duties under ERISA,
the case did not fall within the "peripheral and remote" exception to
the preemption statute.2 4 In another case, an employer's alleged oral
agreement to provide a severance benefit was held to be an ERISA
plan that preempted the employee/plaintiff's common law breach of
208. Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective
Federalism, 48 U. PrIr. L. REV. 427, 483 (1987) [hereinafter Gregory].
209. See, e.g., McMahan v. McDowell, 7 EBC 1859 (3rd Cir. 1986); Central States
Pension Fund v. Kraft Co., 7 EBC 2257 (6th Cir. 1986); Blakemen v. Mead Containers,
779 F.2d 1146, 1149 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985); Ellenberg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091
(9th Cir. 1985).
210. See, e.g., Jackson v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 7 EBC 2767 (lth Cir. 1986);
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 968 (1983); Miner v. International Typographical Union Pension Plan, 601 F Supp.
1390 (D. Colo. 1985); King v. James River-Pepperell, Inc., 593 F Supp. 1344 (D. Mass.
1984); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Kelly v. International
Business Machines Corp., 573 F Supp. 366 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
211. See, e.g., Dependahl v. Falstaff, 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981); Ogden v. Michigan
Bell Tel. Co., 657 F Supp. 328 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (state board and misrepresentation
claims preempted); Howard v. Parisian Inc., No. 86-7401, slip op. (N.D. Ala. 1987)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress claim preempted); Sokol v. Bernstein, No. 85-
6357, slip op. (C.D. Cal. 1986) (emotional distress damage claim dismissed).
212. Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 562 F Supp. 1286 (E.D. Ill. 1983).
213. Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 800 (6th Cir. 1985).
214. Id. at 800 n.6.
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contract action for the severance benefit.215 The court acknowledged
that it could entertain an ERISA cause of action for benefits under
the "plan," but that the employee/plaintiff had solely pursued a breach
of contract cause of action and could not adopt an ERISA theory on
appeal. 216 In contrast, some state claims have been sustained and held
not preempted by ERISA. 217
IV PREVENTIVE PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
Although the precise cause of action for wrongful discharge arises
out of a termination of employment for reasons which violate state or
federal public policy, modern wrongful discharge actions are creatures
of contract. 2 I Given this premise, an employer may choose either or
both of two approaches to controlling wrongful discharge actions: (1)
it may choose to disclaim the existence of any contract or representation
215. Haigler v. J. F Jelenko & Co., 7 EBC 2376 (Miss. Ct. App. 1986). In contrast,
a recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit, Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956 (1Ith
Cir. 1986), held that although federal courts can create federal common law under ERISA,
because under ERISA oral modifications of employee benefit plans are not permissible
the common law doctrine of estoppel permitting oral modifications of ERISA plans was
not available. Id. at 959-61.
216. Haigler v. J. F Jelenko & Co., 7 EBC 2376, 2378 (Miss. Ct. App. 1986). Under
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(I) state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts
over an action for benefits.
217. See Kelly v. IBM Corp., 573 F Supp. 366 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (ERISA did not
preempt employee's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Babiarz v. Hartford
Special, Inc., 480 A.2d 561 (Conn. App. 1984) (breach of contract action to enjoin
termination of retirement benefits not preempted); Miner v. International Typographical
Union Pension Plan, 601 F. Supp. 1390 (D. Colo. 1985) (court suggests common law
claims proper in state if brought in state court). The Ninth Circuit held that a state fair
employment agency's action against an ERISA covered fund based on charges of age
and race discrimination by an employee of the fund itself were not preempted because
the state law only prohibited employment discrimination and did not regulate the "terms
and conditions" of employee benefit plans. Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337, 1338 (9th Cir.
1984).
218. See, e.g., Pugh v. Sees Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311 (1981) (discharge
for supporting federal and state policies toward organized labor wrongful); Bonham v.
Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977) (Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act provides its own legal remedy; therefore, policies therein not basis for wrongful
discharge action); Dadas v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 529 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Ohio 1981)
(no basis for wrongful discharge in Ohio employment discrimination statute); Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443 (1980) (employee alleging that implied
contract prevents termination without cause demonstrates exception modifying employment
at will and implies a contractual covenant that employer must act in good faith in carrying
out implied contract); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St.-3d 100 (1985) (employer
conditional promise to reinstate may create contractual modification of doctrine of em-
ployment at-will or may estop employer from relying on the doctrine); Hedrick v. Center
for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment, 7 Ohio App. 3d 211 (Hamilton Cty. App.
1982) (allegations citing promises in employee handbook may show modification of
employment at-will by contract or estoppel); Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (employer's written policies can give rise
to contractual rights even without "mutuality" and specific contractual term of employment).
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modifying the doctrine of employment at-will; and/or (2) it may choose
to deal, within the four corners of the contract, with employee complaints
of wrongful discharge.
A. Protecting Employment At-Will in the Employee Handbook
The most obvious opportunity for an employer to madvertantly modify
the employment at-will relationship is in an employee handbook or a
well-published procedure manual. Both have become popular means of
communicating employer personnel policies to employees. A number of
jurisdictions have found binding contractual representations, or repre-
sentations giving rise to promissory estoppel, in employee handbooks
and manuals. 19
Notwithstanding an employer's ability to modify the doctrine of
employment at-will through an employee handbook or personnel manual,
the same vehicle may be used to confirm that the employee is terminable
at-will. In Argento v A & I Weiss Brothers, Inc.,220 the employee's
complaint was dismissed because the language of the employment con-
tract provided for termination at-will. Similarly, where a handbook
indicates within its four corners that it merely represents a unilateral
statement of company rules, such a reservation may be sufficient in
itself to prevent the handbook from creating a contract.22' Thus, state-
ments within a handbook or manual that the policies set forth are subject
to unilateral change by the employer and that the policies are for the
employer's convenience may well limit the contractual or estoppel effect
of the policies on employment at-will status.
Several courts have held that prominently displayed disclaimers of
contractual commitment, when appearing within a handbook or personnel
manual, are sufficient to negate contractual or promissory estoppel
claims. In South v Toledo Edison Company,222 a disclaimer stating
that pronouncements in the handbook and other written policy documents
should not be construed as a promise of continued employment was
sufficient to negate a contract. A similar disclaimer of contractual
obligations within a handbook precluded an employee's claim for sev-
219. See generally, Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 472 N.E.2d 765
(Lucas Cty. App. 1984); Hedrick v. Center for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment, 7
Ohio App. 3d 211, n.1, 454 N.E.2d 1393 (1986); Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, n.1, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche,
Inc., 119 LRRM 2380 (1985).
220. Case No. 82CV-09-5266 (Franklin Cty. Ohio CP, Nov. 1982). See also Russell
v. R & I Weiss Bros., Case No. 82-CV-09-5326 (Franklin Cty. Ohio CP Dec. 1982).
221. Wojciechowski v. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc., Case No. 1-83-089 (Lucas Cty. Ohio
App., July 1983); Isgro v. Deaconess Hosp., Case No. 41996 (Cuyahoga Cty. Ohio App.,
Nov. 1980).
222. Case No. L-85-083 (Lucas Cty. Ohio App., Mar. 1986). See also Procumar v.
General Motors Corp., Case No. 8427 (Montgomery Cty. Ohio App., Apr. 1984).
276
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erance pay based upon a handbook provision. 223 In Rachubka v St.
Thomas Hospital Medical Center,224 the court dismissed the employee's
contractual claim because the handbook contained the simple statement
that all employees were terminable at-will, thus reaffirming, within the
four corners of what the employee alleged was the agreement, the
common law rule of employment at-will.
Most handbooks and personnel manuals begin with a brief introductory
statement containing the philosophy of the employer and the purpose
of the handbook or manual. One suggested method for reaffirming the
at-will status of the employee and disclaiming any contractual obligations
based upon the handbook would be to include a paragraph stating that
the handbook procedures are: (1) subject to unilateral change by the
employer; (2) not intended to give rise to any contract with any employee;
(3) that such pronouncements are merely recommended procedures for
use by supervisors; and (4) all employees are considered to be terminable
at the will of the employer. This paragraph could be inserted at the
end of the introductory philosophical statement.
B. Affirmance of Employment At-Will in the Employment Application
Since the application for employment is a separate document from
any procedure manual or handbook and is normally the document
triggering the employment relationship, contractual disclaimers are most
effective if included within it. Indeed, at the end of most modern
employment applications, the prospective employee is required to sign
an acknowledgment that all statements made within the application are
true. A prominent disclaimer of contract and a statement reaffirming
employment at-will within such an acknowledgment could well be viewed
as most persuasively reflecting the intent of the parties.
In Batchelor v Sears, Roebuck & Company,225 an employment ap-
plication advertised itself as the entire agreement between the parties.
It further stated that any additional terms applicable to the "contract"
between the employer and employee could be added only by a president
or vice president of the company The terms in the application included
the declaration that the relationship was "at-will." The district court
held that both the "at-will" statement and the requirement that the
contract could only be modified by an officer of the company were
valid parts of the agreement, and that those terms protected the employer
from the employee's assertions that the contract had been orally modified
in the course of her employment to one of just cause for discharge.
Further, when the employee claimed that she did not closely read the
223. White v. Picker Int'l, Case No. 49770 (Cuyahoga Cty. Ohio App., Dec. 1985).
224. Case No. 11596 (Summit Cty. Ohio App., Oct. 1984).
225. 574 F Supp. 1480 (D.C. Mich. 1983).
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application and therefore could not be held bound by it, the court ruled
that, if true, this constituted negligence and estopped the employee from
avoiding the instrument.226
Ideally, the acknowledgment in the employee application would also
state, in prominent, darkened lettenng, that the employee serves at the
will of the employer and that employment can be terminated at any
time by either the employer or the employee. Additionally, it would
include a similarly highlighted statement to the effect that a contract
of employment can be made with an employee only by a primary officer
of the company, that no other employee or agent of the company is
empowered to make such a contract, and any such contract must be
made in writing or the employer will not honor it. In any event,
disclaimers of contract and assertions of "at-will" employment in the
job application might well be rendered ineffective if the employee later
receives from the employer a handbook, personnel manual, or other
written document representing that the employee has certain rights to
continued employment, to due process in termination, or to other pro-
gressive disciplinary measures prior to termination. 227 Thus, whatever
disclaimers or assertions of "at-will" employment are contained in the
job application, the same representations should be contained in any
successive written personnel policy statements published to employees
by the employer.
C. Dispute Resolution Procedures Adopted by the Employer
May Preclude Traditional Wrongful Discharge Suits
As pointed out in previous sections of this Article, federal and state
courts have long held that grievance machinery contained in collective
bargaining agreements between employers and unions precludes indi-
vidual wrongful discharge suits. With the exception of fair representation
suits under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, an
employer or an employee has only a right to appeal a contract arbitrator's
decision, but no right to de novo review of the decision.22 Federal
226. See also Summers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 549 F Supp. 1157 (D.C. Mich.
1982).
227. In Kochis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Case No. CA-2175 (Richland Cty. Ohio
App., Feb. 1984), a jury verdict for an employee, based on contract, was upheld despite
an application disclaimer because other evidence of employer representations tended to
support a contract which modified the "at-will" relationship.
228. See supra text accompanying note 220. In a fair representation suit, the employee-
union member who has exhausted the contractual grievance procedure without resulting
relief or proves that such exhaustion would have been futile sues the union and the
employer to demonstrate that inadequate representation by the union thwarted his otherwise
meritorious contractual claim. The employee is entitled to a jury, and the full ments of
the employee's underlying claim are often fully litigated. Vaca v. Sipes, 368 U.S. 171
(1969). This suit, however, is a creature of statute, and applies only where the contract
in question is between the employer and the union. 29 U.S.C. § 185.
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courts, without a jury, will only look at the collective bargaining agree-
ment and the written determination of the final grievance step to
determine if the decision draws its essence from the agreement. If so,
it is summarily upheld.229 When employees covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements between a union and their employer attempt to
circumvent the contractual grievance procedure to bring traditional
wrongful discharge actions before courts with juries, the courts bar all
such claims until the employee/plaintiff exhausts the contractual pro-
cedure or demonstrates that the use of the procedure would have been
futile. 0
Even after the doctrines of deferential review and exhaustion of
contractual grievance procedures were well established, it was not clear
that where a grievance mechanism in a contract culminated in anything
less than a full blown hearing and decision by a neutral arbitrator these
doctrines would still apply. In Haynes v United States Pipe & Foundry
Company,2 1 a collective bargaining agreement provided that a four-step
grievance procedure's final review be conducted by the plant manager,
not a neutral arbitrator. Further, the agreement stated that if the parties
could not reach a settlement of the grievance, the union would be free
to resort to an economic strike. Although the grievance was taken
through the initial four steps of the procedure, the employees did not
strike; therefore, the court held that judicial review of the merits of
the dispute was precluded by the failure to exhaust contractual remedies,
i.e., to strike.
Since the Haynes decision, courts have consistently held that, whether
or not the contractual grievance procedure culminates in a full blown
hearing with an arbitrator, exhaustion will be required as long as the
procedure clearly states that it is designed to be final and that the
parties will be bound by its outcome.232 Under federal labor law, then,
if a contractual grievance procedure is fair on its face and the employee
229. See supra text accompanying notes 123-26, 128. See also, e.g., United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 123-26, 128. Wrongful discharge suits, in-
cluding other claims in tort such as infliction of emotional distress and defamation, were
dismissed in favor.of exhaustion of contractual remedies in Truex v. Garrett Freightlines,
121 LRRM 3065 (9th Cir. 1986), Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 558, 564,
277 P.2d 464 (1954), and Braswell v. Lucas Metro. Housing Auth., 26 Ohio App. 3d
51, 498 N.E.2d 184 (Lucas Cty. 1985). Even when non-exhausting employees have raised
the futility defense, in most cases they have failed to meet the futility burden of proof
and exhaustion has still been required. See generally, LeBoutillard v. Airline Pilot's Ass'n,
121 LRRM 3383 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th
Cir. 1984).
231. 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966); accord Huffman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
752 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1985).
232. See generally, Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., 748 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1984); S. J.
Groves & Sons v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 581 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1978).
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cannot produce substantial evidence that resort to it would be futile,
the employee will be required to exhaust contractual remedies before
bringing suit in court. In the event of such suit, the court will review
the procedure as applied to the facts of the employee's case and the
collective bargaining agreement. If the agreement procedure was fairly
applied, the decision will be upheld.
Under similar reasoning to that employed by federal courts reviewing
labor contract grievance procedures, there is virtually no practical reason
why a voluntary employer-initiated grievance procedure which is not a
part of a collective bargaining agreement but is included in an employer's
handbook should not be governed by similar rules. In McMillion v
Appalachian Power Company,233 a non-union employer's handbook set
forth a four-step grievance procedure. A discharged employee attempted
to bring suit against the employer in federal court without exhausting
the procedure in the handbook. The employee alleged causes of action
for wrongful discharge, breach of express contract of employment, and
breach of implied contract of employment. In granting the employer's
motion for directed verdict, the court first found that the handbook, as
well as the oral representations surrounding it, constituted a contract
of employment between the parties. In other words, it found that the
employee's allegations of contract were supported by the evidence. The
court next found that both parties were bound by the terms and conditions
of the contract made up of the handbook and the oral representations
surrounding it. Since the voluntary grievance procedure was a term of
the contract, the employee was not entitled to bring a court action
enforcing the contract until that grievance procedure had been exhausted.
The court in McMillion found only that the exhaustion requirement
was applicable to a non-union contract embodying an employer voluntary
grievance procedure. It was not required, based on the posture of the
case, to determine what standard of review of the outcome of the
grievance procedure it would employ if the employee/plaintiff had first
exhausted, were denied relief, and then resorted to the court. However,
since the reasoning of the McMillion court so closely parallels that of
federal courts in reviewing collective bargaining agreement procedures,
it is not unlikely that it would also have accorded deference in reviewing
the result of non-union procedure. This is particularly true since the
gravamen of the employee's claim of wrongful discharge was grounded
in proving the very contract that integrally contained the grievance
procedures.
In Hamby v Genesco, Inc.,23 4 a state appeals court did review the
outcome of a voluntary grievance procedure, without a jury, and upheld
233. 115 LRRM 4294 (S.D. W Va. 1982).
234. 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. App. 1981).
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the outcome. Indeed, the policy reasons often stated by courts for the
requirements of exhaustion of contractual grievance procedures and
deferential review of the outcome of those procedures in collective
bargaining agreements seem equally applicable in the context of a
contract between an individual employee and the employer:
A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to
completely side-step the available grievance procedures in favor
of a lawsuit has little to commend it [I]t would deprive the
employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform and
exclusive method for the orderly settlement of employee
grievances. 23
In either the union or non-union context, judicial decisions favoring
deference to contractual employee dispute procedures advance the policy
of judicial economy, reduce court dockets, and encourage the parties
to police their own agreements.
D. Employer-Employee Contractual Dispute Resolution Procedures
Interest in the voluntary adoption of grievance procedures has been
increasing over the past few years. In addition to reducing the impact
of erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, employers are finding that
voluntarily adopted grievance procedures enhance employee job satis-
faction by providing many of the same elements of job security tradi-
tionally provided by unions and amplify the employee's sense of well-
being by reducing feelings of powerlessness. 236 The employer instituting
a voluntary grievance procedure will need a procedure which is suffi-
ciently fair, both on its face and in its administration, to warrant
deference from courts requiring exhaustion, as well as a system en-
couraging employees to use it.
Commentators generally agree that any voluntary grievance procedure
requires a clear written description which: (1) clarifies management's
interest in dealing with disputes as they arise; (2) informs employees
as to how to complain and protest and to whom; (3) demonstrates where
to make the first approach and a clear method of appeal if that approach
is unsuccessful; and (4) employs reasonable time frames within which
the employee's complaint will be answered. A policy embodying the
above four criteria should be clearly stated, made known to all employees
at the commencement of employment, and re-emphasized to both em-
ployees and their supervisors at regular intervals. 237 Finally, any grievance
235. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
236. BalfourN Five Types of Non-Union Grievance Systems, PERSONNEL MAGAZINE,
(Mar.-Apr. 1984).
237. Human Resources Management: "Personnel Practices," ch. 3015 (CCH).
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system requires clear assurances that an employee who resorts to it will
be protected from retaliation. In other words, the system and its ad-
ministrators must ensure that in most cases the employee will prevail
when appropriate, and that use will be free from unfair or onerous side
effects.23 8
Two popular systems of voluntary grievance handling are the "open-
door policy" and the corporate "ombudsman." The former merely gives
an employee the freedom to bypass one or more levels of management
and proceed directly to upper management or to personnel in the hope
of obtaining a more open-minded attitude towards solving the problem.
The latter usually involves a dispute resolution specialist within the
company who has the expertise to act as an informal mediator between
the employee and the managers whom the employee believes are re-
sponsible for the problem.239 Because these methods of grievance handling
are typically open-ended, lack specific procedures, and do not result in
written findings of fact, it is unlikely that courts would be willing to
defer to them in terms of requiring exhaustion, and even less likely to
apply some form of deferential review. 240
The forms of internal grievance procedures currently in use which
would most likely result in court deference and in employee perceptions
of fairness are outside arbitration and peer review. Both of these methods
of internal dispute resolution permit the employee to take an active,
confrontational part in the proceedings and normally result in written
findings. 241 For the employer who does not want to bear the expense of
outside arbitration, the best choice may be a well-structured peer review
procedure. A peer review committee is made up of a group of the
grieving employee's peers, a committee of supervisory and/or manage-
ment employees not immediately involved in the grieving employee's
problem, or some combination of co-employees and managers. One
ingredient ensuring fairness might be to give the employee some voice
in selecting members of the peer review committee.
The drawback to peer review is that the employer and employee
should expect an occasional incorrect decision from the committee since
the "peers" are not professional arbiters but are instead co-workers. On
the other hand, the peer committee would have great familiarity with
the workplace, therefore closely paralleling the kind of review obtained
from a specialist arbitrator. Additionally, as equals or near equals of
238. Balfour, supra note 236.
239. Id.
240. See Le Boutillard v. Airline Pilot's Ass'n, 121 LRRM 3383 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984).
241. Human Resources Management: "Personnel Practices," ch. 3015, 3045 (CCH);
Individual Employment Rights, "Arbitration May Stem Suits by Non-union Employees"
(BNA. 11/25/86).
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the employee, they closely parallel the ideal jury found in state or
federal court.242
If voluntary internal dispute resolution or grievance procedures are
adopted by an employer, the general type of dispute resolution used is
much less important than the specific written procedures and the actual
fairness in admmstration of those procedures. The value of a clearly
written and fair procedure was well illustrated in Bowes v. Hyatt Hotel
Corporation.243 In that case, an employee sought to litigate in court a
claim that her employer had unfairly passed her over for promotion.
Her allegations of unfairness were based upon certain guarantees in a
handbook supplied by her employer. The court agreed with her that
the employee handbook contained certain terms of an implied contract
with which the employer should be required to comply, but. it also held
that the clear grievance procedure set forth in the same handbook as
a method for adjudicating disputes had been ignored. Finding no reason
to believe that those procedures would not have been fairly applied, it
dismissed the case.
Because of the broad preemptive effect granted ERISA, an employer's
decision to incorporate ERISA-covered benefits in an employee benefit
plan can immunize those benefit decisions from state court review and
from the requirements imposed by state statutes. Furthermore, employees
seeking to challenge a plan administrator's benefits decision must pursue
the appeal procedure contained in the plan, and can overturn an ultimate
adverse decision by the plan only if the employee can demonstrate to
a court that the plan's decision was arbitrary or capricious.2 4 Therefore,
an employer attempting to establish a truly uniform grievance procedure
should consider incorporating the internal dispute resolution system in
its ERISA plan.
On its face, a grievance procedure itself does not seem to be a fringe
benefit or an employee welfare benefit plan to which ERISA applies.
However, there is some basis for the position that an internal grievance
program implicates ERISA's regulatory concerns and should operate
without the interference of conflicting state regulations.
One justification for labeling a voluntary grievance procedure an
ERISA-covered benefit could rest on the relationship between the out-
come. of the grievance procedure and the employer's comrmtment to
provide benefits to employees. This proposal may even be viewed as an
242. Courts have often reasoned that arbitrators' decisions are entitled to deference
partly because they are better qualified than judges or juries by virtue of familiarity with
work environments. See generally United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
243. Civil District Court, State of Louisiana, Parish of Orleans Case No. 80-16758
(July 1, 1981).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 163-68.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
extension of current accepted ERISA practices. Certain benefits deter-
minations processed under ERISA plans necessarily analyze the cir-
cumstances surrounding an employee's termination of employment and
establish the reasons for the discharge. For example, the Supreme Court
only recently emphasized that an employer's cQmmitment to pay sev-
erance benefits to employees through a detailed administrative scheme
involving "matters such as eligibility" is a "plan" covered by ERISA.241
If an employer requires discharged or laid-off employees to process any
grievances they have over their termination in order to obtain severance
benefits, or condition receipt of severance pay on factors relating to the
reason for discharge, the employer can possibly describe the grievance
mechanism as a systematic administrative scheme established to deter-
mine the eligibility of severance pay claimants. 246
Another, broader justification for the characterization of an internal
dispute resolution process as an ERISA benefit is by reference to the
definition of employee "welfare plan." "Welfare plan" includes any
program which provides benefits for contingencies such as illness, ac-
cident, disability, death, or unemployment.2 4 Similarly, the ERISA
regulations promulgated under this section state that the definition of
"welfare plan" includes plans providing benefits which are similar to
severance benefits "although not so characterized. '248 An employer's
voluntary grievance procedures thus arguably come under the statute's
definition of "welfare plan" as a program providing benefits for the
contingency of unemployment, or as a plan providing a benefit similar
to or in substance a severance-type benefit.
If an internal dispute resolution process can be characterized as a
plan governed by ERISA, it should qualify for preemption protection.
Given the status of wrongful discharge law in the fifty states, a regional
or national employer could not establish and consistently enforce a
"uniform administrative scheme which provides a set of standard pro-
cedures to guide processing of claims. '249 If falling under ERISA's
preemption umbrella, companies could operate the grievance procedure
245. Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211, 2215 n.5 (1987).
246. Other examples of benefits decisions reviewing an employer's basis for termination
exist. In the course of determining if a beneficiary is entitled to elect "continuation
coverage" of a group health plan under 26 U.S.C. § 162(k), the question whether or not
an employee was terminated "other than by reason of gross misconduct" can be decided.
26 U.S.C. § 162(k)(3)(B). Also, the application of valid "bad boy" clauses or forfeiture
provisions in employee welfare benefit plans or pension plans with excess or accelerated
vesting schedules rests on determinations that the employee committed a wrongful act
against the employer. 26 C.F.R. § 1.411 (a)-4(c) example (1) (1986). See, e.g., Gutting
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 541 F Supp. 345 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
247. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982).
248. Id. at § 2510.3-1(a)(3) (1986).
249. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211, 2216 (1987).
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system without being required to accommodate conflicting state regu-
latory schemes. The dispute- resolution process could be governed by a
uniform set of administrative practices without exposure to "a patchwork
scheme of regulation. '250 Employees in turn obtain the guarantee that
the grievance system meets applicable uniform ERISA standards and
is subject to ERISA's reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary requirements.
At first blush, it may seem remote to suggest that federal rather
than state law could or should govern employees' ability to bring wrongful
discharge actions without exhausting internal grievance procedures. How-
ever, the need and desire to implement an enforceable, internal dispute
resolution process sheltered from the "balkanized patchwork" 25' of state
statutory and common law regulation is rational, and responds to the
diverse transformations in wrongful discharge law from what was, in
effect, a uniform "federal" common law of employment at-will. Whether
through ERISA or some other federal statutory framework, a legislative
scheme permiting employers and employees to establish, rely upon and
enforce a fair and full grievance procedure would protect each from
the vagaries of both weak and strong state regulation.
V CONCLUSION
Management consultants and social scientists now estimate that at
least a third of United States employers are using some kind of voluntary
complaint system within their organizations.2 2 Although the cost of such
procedures, including adminstrative time implementing and adminis-
trating them, may be high, court dockets in several states are overflowing
with wrongful discharge suits seeking remedies ranging from several
hundred thousand to several million dollars. Private or contractual dispute
resolution in a non-union employment setting, therefore, is an idea .that
employers and employees should embrace.
250. Id. at 2217.
251. Gregory, supra note 208, at 484.
252. RowE & BAKER, THE EXECUTIVE DILEMMA: "ARE You HEARING ENOUGH
EMPLOYEE CONCERNS?" (1985). In the article "Non-union Grievance Procedures" ap-
pearing in the January 1985 edition of Personnel Magazine, the author reported on the
results of a study which had been conducted among the magazine's readers approximately
one year earlier. A hundred questionnaires were sent out and fifty-two companies responded.
Of the fifty-two respondants to the "Personnel" study, 62% said they had a formal
grievance procedure for non-unionized employees. 45% of the respondants to the study
utilized a written multi-step procedure. 25% of these respondants' systems had been in
effect for longer than ten years, and 37% had been in effect from one to ten years. The
first two steps to all of these procedures involved the immediate and intermediate supervisors
as representatives of management. The third step invariably employed some form of peer
review normally called a "jury" or "hearing committee." These committees varied in size
from three to five members, but the majority of committees had some members chosen
by the employee.

